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Statins and Adverse Cardiovascular
Events in Moderate-Risk Females:
A Statistical and Legal Analysis
with Implications for FDA
Preemption Claims
Theodore Eisenberg* and Martin T. Wells
This article presents: (1) meta-analyses of studies of cardioprotection of
women and men by statins, including Lipitor (atorvastatin), and (2) a legal
analysis of advertising promoting Lipitor as preventing heart attacks. The
meta-analyses of primary prevention clinical trials show statistically signifi-
cant benefits for men but not for women, and a statistically significant
difference between men and women. The analyses do not support (1)
statin use to reduce heart attacks in women based on extrapolation from
men, or (2) approving or advertising statins as reducing heart attacks
without qualification in a population that includes many women. The legal
analysis raises the question of whether Lipitor’s advertisements, which omit
that Lipitor’s clinical trial found slight increased risk for women, is consis-
tent with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and related Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulations. The analysis suggests that FDA regula-
tion should not preempt state law actions challenging advertising that is not
supported by FDA-approved labeling. Our findings suggesting inadequate
regulation of the world’s best-selling drug also counsel against courts
accepting the FDA’s claimed preemption of state law causes of action relat-
ing to warnings and safety. Courts evaluating preemption claims should
*Address correspondence to Theodore Eisenberg, Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell
Law School, Myron Taylor Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853; email: ted-eisenberg@lawschool.cornell.edu.
Wells is Charles A. Alexander Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University, Professor of
Clinical Epidemiology and Health Services Research, Cornell University Weill Medical College,
and Elected Member of the Law Faculty, Cornell University.
We thank Kevin Clermont, Dr. Orli Etingin, Dr. Curt Furberg, Valerie Hans, Janey Peterson,
Dr. Michael Pignone, Norma Schwab, Stewart Schwab, and referees for comments. Michael
Heise served as the editor for this article. We served as consultants for plaintiffs’ counsel in
litigation relating to Vioxx.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Volume 5, Issue 3, 507–550, September 2008
© 2008, Copyright the Authors
Journal compilation © 2008, Cornell Law School and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
507
consider actual agency performance as well as theoretical institutional com-
petence. Billions of health-care dollars may be being wasted on statin use by
women but the current regulatory regime does not create incentives to
prevent such behavior.
I. Introduction
Lisa W, an active and healthy woman in her 50s, was told she had high
cholesterol. Her doctor recommended Lipitor (atorvastatin), a member of
the class of statin drugs. Lisa, reluctant to take a prescription medicine
when she felt fine, wanted to try to reduce her cholesterol through exer-
cise and diet. She reduced her total cholesterol by 35 points but her doctor
continued to recommend Lipitor because her total cholesterol still was
above present guidelines. Lisa reports knowing many female acquaintances
with similar stories.
Their experiences may be typical of millions of women. A 1996–1997
study found that women without coronary heart disease (CHD) constituted
23.1 percent of statin recipients, that 1.7 percent of women under age 70
without a history of CHD were prescribed statins, and that 9.1 percent of
women age 70 or over without a history of CHD were prescribed statins.1
Data through 2004 show 39.8 percent of statin users were at low risk for
cardiovascular disease (CVD).2 As of 2004 in British Columbia, 20.9 percent
of those aged 65 to 85 years and 7.5 percent of those aged 45 to less than 65
years were using statins, with Lipitor by far the most widely used statin.3 In
three Norwegian counties, over 20 percent of women aged 60 to 80 used
statins, with Lipitor again the most widely used.4 By any reasonable measure,
1Isabelle Savoie & Arminée Kazanjian, Utilization of Lipid-Lowering Drugs in Men and Women:
A Reflection of the Research Evidence? 55 J. Clin. Epidem. 95, 97–98 (2002).
2Colette B. Raymond et al., A Population-Based Analysis of Statin Utilization in British
Columbia, 29 Clin. Therapeutics 2107, 2115 (2007).
3Id. at 2109.
4Ingeborg Hartz et al., Aspects of Statin Prescribing in Norwegian Counties with High, Average
and Low Statin Consumption—An Individual-Level Prescription Database Study, 7 BMC Clin.
Pharmacology 14 (2007).
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females without a history of CHD constitute a major segment of the statins
market. Lipitor has been the top-selling drug in the world5 and has
accounted for over $12 billion in annual sales.6
This article reports meta-analyses that question Lipitor’s advertising.
Pfizer, Inc., the producer of Lipitor, claims that Lipitor is clinically estab-
lished to reduce heart attacks without any indication of qualification by
gender. Pfizer states:
LIPITOR is clinically proven to reduce the risk of heart attack, stroke, certain
kinds of heart surgeries, and chest pain in patients with several common risk
factors for heart disease.† [†Risk factors include family history, high blood
pressure, age, low HDL (“good” cholesterol), or smoking.]7
The words are presumably chosen carefully and one might reasonably con-
clude that age plus low HDL, for example, would count as “multiple risk
factors” for which clinical proof exists that Lipitor reduces heart attack risk.
We are unable to find high-quality clinical proof in the medical literature
documenting reduced heart attack risk for women. Furthermore, Pfizer’s
advertising omits label information relevant to women. In discussing the
clinical trial of Lipitor, Pfizer’s label states:
LIPITOR significantly reduced the rate of coronary events [either fatal coronary
heart disease . . . or nonfatal MI]. . . . Due to the small number of events, results
for women were inconclusive.8
This express acknowledgment of “inconclusive” results for women contrasts
with the cardioprotective claims, not qualified by gender, in Pfizer’s adver-
tising. Nor does the label or the advertising disclose that the key clinical trial
5Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug Companies 85 (2004).
6Stephanie Saul, Pfizer to End Lipitor Ads by Jarvik, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2008 ($12.7 billion in
2007 sales of Lipitor); Peter Loftus, Pfizer’s Lipitor Patent Reissue Rejected, Wall St. J. Online,
Aug. 16, 2007 ($12.9 billion in 2006 sales of Liptor); Julie Schmit, Lipitor Sales on Track to Hit
Record Despite Arrival of Generic, USA Today, July 20, 2006.
7See 〈http://www.lipitor.com/about-lipitor/benefits.jsp?setShowOn=../about-lipitor/benefits.
jsp&setShowHighlightOn=../about-lipitor/benefits.jsp〉, accessed Mar. 22, 2008.
8Pfizer Label, LAB-0021-15.0, revised Mar. 2007, at 5.
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of Lipitor found a modest increased risk of heart problems in women.9 The
nondisclosures continued even after a discussion of relevant statin studies
concluded that the existing literature provides no “significant evidence to
back up the claim that statin therapy reduces the risk of CHD in women
without heart disease”10 and despite well-documented calls for statin use to
be refocused toward those for whom clinical evidence of benefit exists.11
The possibility remains that cardioprotection claims for women might
be based on extrapolation from results for men. Recent meta-analyses of
statins’ effects for women have yielded conflicting results. Walsh and
Pignone’s thorough study finds that cholesterol-lowering drugs did not
reduce CHD death or nonfatal myocardial infarction (NFMI).12 Thaven-
diranathan et al. appear to report greater cardioprotection for women than
men.13 Neither study assessed outcomes separately for men and women,
thereby leaving unanswered the question of whether cardioprotection claims
for women might reasonably be extrapolated from results for men. Our
meta-analyses assess random control trials (RCTs) that report statins’ effects
for men and women. The outcome of interest is CHD death and NFMI.
Consistently with Walsh and Pignone, for women without preexisting heart
disease or diabetes, we find no evidence that RCTs support the claim that
statins reduce CHD-NFMI. Instead, we find a statistically significant differ-
ence between outcomes for men and women. This undermines basing
cardioprotection claims for women on extrapolation from men’s results.
9Peter S. Sever et al., Prevention of Coronary and Stroke Events with Atorvastatin in Hyperten-
sive Patients Who Have Average or Lower-than-Average Cholesterol Concentrations, in
the Anglo-Scandinavian Cardiac Outcomes Trial—Lipid Lowering Arm (ASCOT–LLA): A
Multicentre Randomised Control Trial, 361 Lancet 1149, 1155 (2003).
10John Abramson, Overdo$ed America: The Broken Promise of American Medicine 139 (2005).
11Savoie & Kazanjian, supra note 1.
12Judith M.E. Walsh & Michael Pignone, Drug Treatment of Hyperlipidemia in Women, 291
JAMA 2243 (2004). Similar conclusions are reached in a Russian study. D.V. Preobrazhenskii
et al., Hypercholesterolemia in Men and Women of Various Age. Part II. The Problem of
Efficacy and Safety of Statins, 47 Kardiologia 75 (2007).
13Paaladinesh Thavendiranathan et al., Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular Diseases with
Statin Therapy: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 166 Arch. Intern. Med. 2307,
2310 (2006) (“In our metaregression analysis, reductions in the risk of major coronary events
from statin therapy were significantly associated with . . . a smaller proportion of men in the
study population (p = .003). . . .”). Thavendiranathan et al. do not attempt to reconcile their
results with the earlier Walsh and Pignone study.
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If we are correct about omissions from Pfizer’s advertising, then
neither market forces nor Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation
has effectively regulated the mass marketing of Lipitor. At a minimum, the
FDA should use its authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) to address massive questionable marketing. In addition, if con-
sumers have not been properly informed about the efficacy of Lipitor or
other drugs, reasonable remedies should exist for costs incurred associated
with nondisclosure. In our federal system, consumer remedies often are
based on state law. State law remedies in areas of federal regulation recently
have been an increasing object of federal preemption analysis. In cases
relating to medical devices, cigarettes, and insecticides, the Supreme Court
has found some common-law actions to be preempted by federal law.14 The
FDA itself has sought to further expand preemption’s scope via a preamble
to its January 2006 prescription drug labeling rule15 and through amicus
briefs filed in court.16
Thus, a question relating to remedies for misleading advertising is the
relation between state law causes of action and FDA regulation. The Lipitor-
statin experience provides an important case study in which to assess legal
theories relating to federal preemption. We first suggest that preemption
analysis of advertising claims differs from preemption analysis of warnings
claims. Existing doctrine supplies no preemption protection from state law
false advertising claims challenging advertising that does not disclose mate-
rial information contained in an FDA-approved drug label. We also suggest
that the Lipitor experience has implications for broader preemption issues.
Courts evaluating preemption claims should consider actual agency perfor-
mance as well as theoretical institutional competence.
The health-care policy implications of questionable Lipitor advertising
are troubling. A substantial portion of the multibillion dollar statins market
14Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (preemption of actions relating to preap-
proved medical devices); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (medical devices); Bates
v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (preemption of common-law actions by the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504 (1992) (common-law actions preempted by Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969).
See generally Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Lewis A. Grossman, Food and Drug Law
1488–1501 (3d ed. 2007).
15FDA, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922–4001 ( Jan. 24, 2006), 2006 WL 160271.
16Hutt et al., supra note 14, at 1495 (noting FDA amicus participation).
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may include users for whom no clinical study supports statins outperfoming
a placebo. Billions of health-care dollars may be saved by more prudent
approvals, marketing, and policing of statins and other drugs.
Section II of this article describes the selection of studies for the
meta-analyses. Section III reports the results, which are discussed in Section
IV. Section V shifts to legal analysis and explores possible violations of federal
and state law. Section VI addresses the question of federal preemption,
including the implications of our scientific analysis for the preemption issue.
Section VII concludes.
II. Study Selection for the Meta-Analyses
This study builds on the work of Walsh and Pignone and Thavendiranathan
et al. in assembling studies for a meta-analysis of drugs’ effects on cardiovas-
cular risk. Thavendiranathan et al. comprehensively searched the literature
for studies of statins’ effects on primary prevention of CVD. They conducted
electronic literature searches of MEDLINE (1966 to June 2005), EMBASE
(1980 to June 2005), Cochrane Collaboration (CENTRAL, DARE, and
CDSR), and the American College of Physicians Journal Club databases
using medical subject headings and keywords related to statins.17 They
limited the studies assessed for statins’ effectiveness to English-language
studies of human subjects, with a mean followup of at least one year, at least
100 reported cardiovascular disease outcomes, no intervention difference
between the treatment and control groups other than the use of a statin, at
least 80 percent of participants not known to have CVD, and at least one
specified outcome, including CHD death and NFMI. They excluded studies
that examined only changes in serum cholesterol concentration or angio-
graphic outcomes, that compared high- to low-dose statins, that prescreened
patients with ultrasound for the presence of atherosclerosis, that targeted
patients with disease states that are not traditional cardiovascular risk factors,
or that did not report the proportion of study participants receiving therapy
as primary prevention.18
To help assure considering all relevant studies that report risks for men
and women, we examined a 2007 U.K. Health Technology Assessment by Ward
17Thavendiranathan et al., supra note 13, at 2308.
18Id.
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et al.19 They used a MEDLINE search to evaluate the literature relating to
statins’ prevention of coronary events.20 They report a list of statin studies
that allowed separate assessment of men and women21 and considered
several studies beyond the inclusion criteria of Thavendiranathan et al. We
also examined the studies referred to in the Expert Panel Report of the National
Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP), which concluded that statin therapy
“reduced risk for CHD in . . . women, in those with or without heart dis-
ease.”22 We also examined the primary prevention studies assessed in Walsh
and Pignone’s review of drug treatment of hyperlipidemia in women.23
We independently evaluated each study reported by Thavendiranathan
et al., by Ward et al.,24 by the NCEP, and by Walsh and Pignone. Thaven-
diranathan et al. included seven studies in their analysis. Two studies lacked
sufficient information to separate results for men and women.25 For the
19S. Ward et al., A Systematic Review and Economic Evaluation of Statins for the Prevention of
Coronary Events, 11 Health Tech. Assessment, No. 14 (2007).
20Id. at 161(Appendix 1).
21Id. at 255 (Appendix 19).
22Third Report of the National Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP) Expert Panel on
Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Cholesterol in Adults (Adult Treatment
Panel III) Final Report, 106 Circulation 3143, 3165 (2002). Studies related to CHD risk in
women appear id. at 3167 (tbl. II.2-3).
23Walsh & Pignone, supra note 12.
24Ward et al., supra note 19.
25Thavendiranathan et al. report using only the primary prevention data reported in the Heart
Protection Study (HPS). See Thavendiranathan et al., supra note 13, at 2309 (tbl. 1, * footnote
to table). This subgroup appears to correspond to those in the HPS who had diabetes but no
CVD. See Heart Protection Study Collaborative Group, MRC/BHF Heart Protection Study of
Cholesterol-Lowering with Simvastatin in 5963 People with Diabetes: A Randomised Placebo-
Controlled Trial, 361 Lancet 2005, 2011 (2003) (fig. 4, showing results for patients with diabetes
but no CVD). HPS does not report separate results for men and women for this subgroup, id.,
and Thavendiranathan et al.’s Table 1 report such data to be unavailable. Thavendiranathan
et al., supra note 13, at 2309 (tbl. 1). The second study for which separate male-female data were
not separately reported is Helen M. Colhoun et al., Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular
Disease with Atorvastatin in Type 2 Diabetes in the Collaorative Atorvastatin Diabetes Study
(CARDS): Multicentre Randomized Placebo-Controlled Trial, 364 Lancet 685, 686 (2004)
(“Men and women aged 40–75 years with type 2 diabetes mellitus (defined with 1985 WHO
criteria)” and other risk factors were included in the study.).
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reasons indicated in Section IV, these studies are also reasonably excluded
on the ground that, unlike the other studies, they are limited to diabetic
patients. Walsh and Pignone included one additional study (ACAPS) in
which all patients had atherosclerosis and in which there were only 19 major
cardiovascular events.26 The additional studies considered by Ward et al. and
NCEP have characteristics that make them unsuitable for purposes of this
study, including patient groups with prior MI,27 prior CHD,28 prior CVD,29
use of nonstatin therapy,30 or different end points.31 Although our evaluation
also considered all studies included in earlier meta-analyses of statins’ effec-
26Curt D. Furberg et al., Effect of Lovastatin on Early Carotid Atherosclerosis and Cardiovascular
Events (ACAPS), 90 Circulation 1679 (2004). For discussion of ACAPS, see Section III.
27Frank M. Sacks et al., The Effect of Pravastatin on Coronary Events After Myocardial Infarction
in Patients with Average Cholesterol Levels, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 1001 (1996).
28The Long-Term Intervention with Pravastatin in Ischaemic Disease(LIPID) Study Group.
Prevention of Cardiovascular Events and Death with Pravastatin in Patients with Coronary Heart
Disease and a Broad Range of Initial Cholesterol Levels, 339 New Eng. J. Med. 1349 (1998); B.
Pitt et al., Pravastatin Limitation of Atherosclerosis in the Coronary Arteries (PLAC I): Reduc-
tion in Atherosclerosis Progression and Clinical Events, 26 J. Am. Coll. Cardiol. 1133 (1995);
W.R. Aengevaeren et al., Functional Evaluation of Lipid-Lowering Therapy by Pravastatin in the
Regression Growth Evaluation Statin Study (REGRESS), 96 Circulation 429 (1997); Scandina-
vian Simvastatin Survival Study Group, Randomised Trial of Cholesterol Lowering in 4444
Patients with Coronary Heart Disease: The Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study (4S), 344
Lancet 1383 (1994).
29Heart Protection Study Collaborative Group, supra note 25, at 2006 (women eligible who had
history of diabetes mellitus, coronary disease, or occlusive disease of noncoronary arteries);
Heart Protection Study Collaborative Group, MRC/BHF Heart Protection Study of Cholesterol
Lowering with Simvastatin in 20536 High-Risk Individuals: A Randomised Placebo-Controlled
Trial, 360 Lancet 7, 8 (2002) (same criteria).
30Henry Buchwald et al., Effect of Partial Ileal Bypass Surgery on Mortality and Morbidity from
Coronary Heart Disease in Patients with Hypercholesterolemia. Report of the Program on the
Surgical Control of the Hyperlidemias (POSCH), 323 New Eng. J. Med. 946 (1990).
31David Waters et al., Effects of Cholesterol Lowering on the Progression of Coronary Arthero-
sclerosis in Women: A Canadian Coronary Atherosclerosis Intervention Trial (CCAIT) Study, 92
Circulation 2404 (1995); R. Salonen et al., The Kuopio Atherosclerosis Prevention Study
(KAPS): Effect of Pravastatin Treatment on Lipids, Oxidation Resistance of Lipoproteins, and
Atherosclerotic Progression, 76 Am. J. Cardiol. 34 (1995) (men only); R. Salonen et al., Kuopio
Atherosclerosis Prevention Study (KAPS): A Population-Based Primary Preventive Trial of the
Effect of LDL Lowering on Atherosclerotic Progression in Carotid and Femoral Arteries, 92
Circulation 1758 (1995).
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tiveness,32 we still had no more than five studies for the present analysis.
Table 1 summarizes characteristics of those five studies.33
III. Results
Table 2 reports the relative risk of CHD and NFMI or similar end points for
men and women and the source of the data. The table exhibits a consistent
pattern. Each study shows a statistically significant effect at p < 0.05 for men.
Yet no study shows such an effect for women, no study’s results for women
approach statistical significance, and in two of the four studies with ascer-
tainable female data, the relative risk point estimate exceeds 1.0. A relative
risk of less than 1 suggests cardioprotection by a drug; a ratio exceeding 1
suggests that a drug increases risk.
Prior to performing, or as part of, a meta-analysis, it is customary to
assess evidence of excess heterogeneity in the underlying effects.34 Hetero-
geneity arises due to differences across studies in populations, exposures,
interventions, outcomes, design, or conduct of studies. Excess heterogeneity
in a meta-analysis reduces the confidence of recommendations about the
32Cholesterol Treatment Trialists’ (CTT) Collaborators, Efficacy and Safety of Cholesterol-
Lowering Treatment: Prospective Meta-Analysis of Data from 90056 Participants in 14
Randomised Trials of Statins, 366 Lancet 1267 (2005); Michael Pignone, Christopher Phillips
& Cynthia Mulrow, Use of Lipid Lowering Drugs for Primary Prevention of Coronary Heart
Disease: Meta-Analysis of Randomised Trials, 321 Brit. Med. J. 1 (2000); John C. LaRosa, Jiang
He & Suma Vupputuri, Effect of Statins on Risk of Coronary Disease: A Meta-Analysis of
Randomized Controlled Trials, 282 JAMA 2340 (1999).
33Curt D. Furberg et al., Major Outcomes in Moderately Hypercholesterolemic, Hypertensive
Patients Randomized to Pravastatin vs Usual Care: The Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering
Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT-LLT), 288 JAMA 2998 (2002); John R.
Downs et al., Primary Prevention of Acute Coronary Events with Lovastatin in Men and Women
with Average Cholesterol Levels: Results of AFCAPS/TexCAPS, 279 JAMA 1615 (1998); Sever
et al., supra note 9 (ASCOT–LLA); James Shepherd et al., Pravastatin in Elderly Individuals at
Risk of Vascular Disease (PROSPER): A Randomised Control Trial, 360 Lancet 1623 (2002);
James Shepherd et al., Prevention of Coronary Heart Disease with Pravastatin in Men with
Hypercholesterolemia, 333 New Eng. J. Med. 1301 (1995) (WOSCOPS). See also Michael
Clearfield et al., Air Force/Texas Coronary Atherosclerosis Prevention Study (AFCAPS/
TexCAPS): Efficacy and Tolerability of Long-Term Treatment with Lovastatin in Women, 10 J.
Women’s Health & Gender-Based Med. 971 (2001) (reporting AFCAPS results for women).
34Julian P.T. Higgins & Simon G.Thompson, Quantifying Heterogeneity in Meta-Analysis, 21
Stats. in Med. 1539 (2002).
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treatment under study. A forest plot (as in Figure 1) is useful for visually
assessing consistency of results across studies. Hypothesis testing can deter-
mine whether statistically significant evidence exists against a null hypothesis
of no heterogeneity. The I-squared statistic,35 which measures the consis-
tency of findings as the proportion of total variation in point estimates
attributable to heterogeneity (rather than sampling error), is used widely to
assess the extent of heterogeneity. A simple categorization of values for
I-squared assigns adjectives of low, moderate, and high to I-squared values
of 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent. The data analysis in Figure 1 uses
the DerSimonian-Laird36 approach to random-effects meta-analysis. The
35Julian P.T. Higgins et al., Measuring Inconsistency in Meta-Analyses, 327 Brit. Med. J. 557
(2003).
36Rebecca DerSimonian & Raghu Kacker, Random-Effects Model for Meta-Analysis of Clinical
Trials: An Update, 28 Contemp. Clin. Trials 105 (2007).
Table 2: Relative Risk of Adverse Coronary Events by Study and Sex
Study (Sex) End Point Assessed
End Point Relative
Risk & 95% CI Source
ALLHAT (male) nonfatal MI/fatal CHD
(secondary end point)
0.84 (0.71–1.00) ALLHAT, p. 3005, Fig. 4B
ALLHAT (female) nonfatal MI/fatal CHD
(secondary end point)
1.02 (0.81–1.28)
AFCAPS (male) nonfatal or fatal
MI/unstable
angina/SCD
0.64 (0.51–0.81) Authors’ calculation
based on AFCAPS, p.
1621, Fig. 4
AFCAPS (female) nonfatal or fatal
MI/unstable
angina/SCD
0.54 (0.22–1.33)
ASCOT (male) nonfatal MI/fatal CHD 0.59 (0.45–0.78) ASCOT, p. 1155, Tbl. 4
ASCOT (female) nonfatal MI/fatal CHD 1.10 (0.57–2.12)
PROSPER (male) nonfatal MI/fatal CHD
plus fatal or nonfatal
stroke
0.77 (0.65–0.92) PROSPER, p. 1626, Tbl. 3
PROSPER (female) nonfatal MI/fatal CHD
plus fatal or nonfatal
stroke
0.96 (0.79–1.17)
WOSCOPS (male) nonfatal MI/fatal CHD 0.70 (0.58–0.84) Authors’ calculation based
on WOSCOPS, p. 1303,
Tbl. 2
Note: CI = confidence interval; SCD = sudden cardiac death; CHD = coronary heart disease.
Citations to sources are in note 33.
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performance of the DerSimonian-Laird moment-based estimator has been
compared to other competing estimates in terms of both bias and mean
squared error, using Monte Carlo simulation, and was found to perform well
in the case, such as ours, where a small number of populations are being
combined.37
Figure 1 reports the results of the meta-analyses. The male portions of
the studies individually and in combination yield a risk ratio of less than 1.
The female portions of the studies individually and in combination never
yield a risk ratio that excludes 1. Moreover, the combined men portions of
the studies and women portions of the studies suggest the need to consider
the sexes separately. The two sexes’ 95 percent confidence intervals do not
37Kurex Sidik & Jeffrey N. Jonkman, A Comparison of Heterogeneity Variance Estimators in
Combining Results of Studies, 26 Stats. in Med. 1964 (2007).
Figure 1: Random effects meta-analysis of statin studies.
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
Overall  (I-squared = 59.2%, p = 0.012)
AFCAPS female
ASCOT male
WOSCOPS male
ASCOT female
PROSPER female
male
female
Subtotal  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.584)
AFCAPS male
ALLHAT male
ALLHAT female
PROSPER male
Subtotal  (I-squared = 39.4%, p = 0.158)
0.79 (0.69, 0.89)
0.54 (0.22, 1.33)
0.59 (0.45, 0.78)
0.70 (0.58, 0.84)
1.10 (0.57, 2.12)
0.96 (0.79, 1.17)
0.98 (0.84, 1.13)
0.64 (0.51, 0.81)
0.84 (0.71, 1.00)
1.02 (0.81, 1.28)
0.77 (0.65, 0.92)
0.72 (0.64, 0.81)
100.00
1.85
10.56
14.57
3.25
13.95
31.71
12.55
15.37
12.66
15.25
68.29
1.5 .7 .8.6 21.5
Note: ES = effect size; CI = confidence interval. Citations to studies are in note 33.
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overlap and one can reject homogeneity across the male-female groups. The
I-squared statistic suggests that about 60 percent of heterogeneity across
studies cannot be explained by chance. Within the male and female sub-
groups, however, I-squared is considerably lower and statistically insignifi-
cant. Thus, within-sex differences in the studies are largely explicable by
chance but across-sex differences are not.
Importantly, as shown in Figure 1’s last column, although the weight
contributed to the combined meta-analysis by women is less than that of men
it is still substantial. The women meta-analysis carries more weight than any
two of the larger men’s studies combined. In all the men’s studies, the
sample was large enough to detect effects at the 95 percent confidence
interval level whereas in none of the women’s studies was an effect found at
that level. Also note that the results for the combined male-female groups
are highly statistically significant, but the analysis shows that this is an artifact
of combining heterogeneous groups, males, for which evidence supports a
statin effect, and females, for which such evidence does not exist.
A. Primary Prevention Ambiguity: PROSPER and ACAPS
As Walsh and Pignone note, the line between primary prevention and sec-
ondary prevention is “somewhat artificial.”38 Studies may include groups of
patients fairly characterized as involving both primary and secondary pre-
vention. The PROSPER study was approximately equally divided between
persons with and without prior CHD.39 We therefore repeated the meta-
analyses excluding PROSPER and found a relative risk for males of 0.70
(95% CI: 0.60–0.82) and for females of 0.99 (95% CI: 0.81–1.23). As in
Figure 1, one can again reject homogeneity of the subgroups (p = 0.007).
The ACAPS study, in which all patients had early carotid atherosclero-
sis,40 might also be regarded as not clearly primary or secondary prevention.
ACAPS did not report separate results for men and women, but Walsh and
Pignone report that there were four female CHD deaths or NFMIs on
placebo (of 227 subjects) and one CHD or NFMI on lovastatin (of 218
38Walsh & Pignone, supra note 12, at 2244.
39Shepherd et al., supra note 33, at 1624 (tbl. 1); Walsh & Pignone, supra note 12, at 2245.
40Furberg et al., supra note 33, at 1680.
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subjects).41 Because of the few ACAPS subjects and events, including ACAPS
has no material effect on our results as that study contributes trivially to a
meta-analysis (less than 1 percent of the weight).
B. Study Quality: ALLHAT
Walsh and Pignone also note that the ALLHAT results have been challenged
on several grounds:
it was unblinded, 32% of the usual care participants started taking lipid-lowering
drugs at some point during the study, and a smaller than expected differential in
total cholesterol was found between the treatment and usual care groups (9.6%),
which is less than half the average for 8 other long-term statin trials with at least
1000 participants.42
To explore results limited to the highest-quality studies, we repeated the
analysis excluding ALLHAT and found a relative risk for males of 0.69 (95%
CI: 0.62–0.77) and for females of 0.95 (95% CI: 0.79–1.14). One can reject
homogeneity of the subgroups (p = 0.005).
So excluding either PROSPER or ALLHAT again yields no material
evidence of benefit for women and significant evidence of male-female
difference. If one excludes both ALLHAT and PROSPER, women contribute
less than 6 percent of the weight to the meta-analyses and gender compari-
sons are not meaningful.
IV. Discussion of Meta-Analyses
Our review suggests the need for modified labeling, marketing, and infor-
mation for physicians. Not one of the studies that include women with a
mixture of risk factors for heart attacks provides statistically significant
support for prescribing Lipitor or other statins to protect against our car-
diovascular end points. Pfizer’s claims of clinical proof that Lipitor reduces
“risk of heart attack . . . in patients with multiple risk factors for heart
disease, including family history, high blood pressure, age, low HDL (‘good’
cholesterol) or smoking” does not appear to be scientifically supported for
large segments of the female population.
41Walsh & Pignone, supra note 12, at 2247.
42Id. at 2248.
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Pfizer’s interpretation of results for females is also questionable. In
discussing the ASCOT clinical trial, which tested Lipitor, Pfizer’s label
states: “Due to the small number of events, results for women were incon-
clusive.”43 This “inconclusive” result contrasts with the cardioprotective
claims, not qualified by gender, in Pfizer’s advertising. Even the claim that
results were merely inconclusive is questionable. As a class, the statin drugs
have not been shown in any of the major RCT primary prevention studies
covered here to significantly reduce the clinical end point events for
females. The data to date, if anything, are reasonably conclusive that statins
have no protective effect against CHD and NFMI for substantial groups
of females. In the ASCOT study, women on Lipitor were found to have
increased risk of relevant adverse outcomes,44 though the result was not
statistically significant.
The NCEP’s discussion of special considerations for women aged 45 to
75 acknowledges the absence of evidence supporting the use of statins. The
NCEP states that the “rationale for therapy is based on extrapolation of
benefit from men of similar risk.”45 It is one thing to extrapolate from men
when no data about women are available. But extrapolating when data are
not missing—in fact, they show no protective effect for women—is not
warranted. Extrapolation from men is questionable because four studies
include women and consistently yield statistically insignificant results for
them. Extrapolation from the male results requires ignoring the absence of
results in the same studies for women.
This study’s results are consistent with those of Walsh and Pignone and
other statin studies. Walsh and Pignone report conclusions with respect to
women not materially different from those here. Our principal added result
is that we report results for both men and women. This permits us to provide
evidence, shown in Figure 1, of statistically significant differences between
men and women. Support for using the statin class of drugs for women
should no longer be supported by claims that (1) benefits were shown for
men and extrapolation to women is appropriate, or (2) results for women
43Label, supra note 8, at 5.
44Sever et al., supra note 9, at 1155 (tbl. 4).
45NCEP, supra note 22, at 3351 (tbl. VIII.2-1).
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did not statistically significantly differ from those in men.46 The results are
also consistent with a non-RCT Japanese study of hypercholesterolemic
patients in which women substantially outnumbered men. No statistically
significant pravastatin effect was found on CHD events, CVD events, or total
mortality.47 The results are also consistent with CASHMERE, an RCT
designed to compare Lipitor “versus placebo in post-menopausal women
with moderate hypercholesterolaemia.”48 That study, limited to women, had
a primary end point of the change in carotid intima-media thickness (IMT).
Carotid IMT is a “closer” surrogate than lipid levels “to measures of health
benefits such as cardiovascular events.”49 CASHMERE found no statistically
significant effect of Lipitor compared to placebo.50
Our meta-analyses results are also consistent with the heart protection
study that was declared as a major success for men and women, although
there was no effect on overall mortality in women.51 Kendrick notes, quoting
from a major conference held in 1992 that looked at the data from 523,737
men and 124,814 women from 19 studies and trials: “Many findings for
women were discrepant from those for men. Of particular importance in
women was considered to be the essentially flat relation of TC [total choles-
terol] to total mortality, total CVD [cardiovascular disease], and total cancer
46Walsh & Pignone, supra note 12, examined the additional secondary end points in AFCAPS/
TexCAPS of revascularization, unstable angina, MI, cardiovascular events, and coronary events;
none had significant effects.
47Junji Koizumi et al., Effect of Pravastatin-Induced LDL-Cholesterol Reduction on Coronary
Heart Disease and Cerebrovascular Disease in Japanese: Hokuriku Lipid Coronary Heart
Disease Study—Pravastatin Atherosclerosis Trial (Holicos-PAT), 9 J. Atherosclerosis & Throm-
bosis 251, 255 (2002) (tbl. 2). Results are not reported separately for men and women but a Cox
proportional hazards model did include gender as an adjustment factor.
48Protocol A2581051, 29 Oct. 2007, Final Report, available at 〈ClinicalTrials.gov〉, last accessed
Mar. 29, 2008. See Tabassome Simon et al., Rationale, Design and Methods of the CASHMERE
Study, 18 Fundamental & Clin. Pharmacol. 131 (2004).
49Bruce M. Psaty & Thomas Lumley, Surrogate End Points and FDA Approval: A Tale of 2
Lipid-Altering Drugs, 299 JAMA 1474, 1475 (2008).
50Protocol A2581051, supra note 48, at 5–6.
51Arnold J. Jenkins, Might Money Spent on Statins be Better Spent? 327 Brit. Med. J. 993 (2003).
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(Jacobs et al.).”52 In our meta-analyses, the findings for women were discrep-
ant from those for men. Grundy points out results, consistent with our
meta-analyses, that clinical trials that have included both men and women
have shown overall risk reduction from cholesterol-lowering therapy.53
Grundy also conjectures that the post-hoc analyses in any of the individual
trials when limited to women failed to show significant risk reduction
because of a lack of statistical power. Our meta-analyses show that this is not
likely the case.
A. Diabetics: CARDS and HPS
The principal difference between this study and Thavendiranathan et al. is
our exclusion of one Lipitor study known as CARDS.54 CARDS does not
separately report results for men and women so we are unable to include
it in our quantitative analysis. Even if the requisite data were available,
including CARDS would be questionable. CARDS, unlike the other studies,
is limited to diabetic patients. Studies limited to diabetics again test the
boundary between primary and secondary prevention because diabetes is
so closely associated with CVD. The American Heart Association position is
that persons with diabetes “can be considered at a level of risk similar to a
patient with established cardiovascular disease . . . .”55 So if a meta-analysis
including CARDS found no male-female difference, it would be appropri-
ate to check the sensitivity of the analysis to excluding CARDS. Studies of
diabetics raise other issues as well. Diabetes increases risk of heart disease
mortality and does so differentially for men and women.56 Without
52Malcom Kendrick, Should Women be Offered Cholesterol Lowering Drugs to Prevent
Cardiovascular Disease? No, 334 Brit. Med. J. 983 (2007), quoting D. Jacobs et al., Report of
the Conference on Low Blood Cholesterol: Mortality Associations, 86 Circulation 1046 (1992).
53Scott M. Grundy, Should Women be Offered Cholesterol Lowering Drugs to Prevent Cardio-
vascular Disease? Yes, 334 Brit. Med. J. 982 (2007).
54Colhoun et al., supra note 25.
55Thomas A. Pearson et al., AHA Guidelines for Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular Disease
and Stroke: 2002 Update, 106 Circulation 388, 389 (2002) (tbl. 1).
56National Institute of Health, National Institute of Diabetes & Digestive & Kidney Diseases,
Diabetes in America 435 (2d ed. 1995).
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accounting for these characteristics, meta-regression using the percent of
females or males as an explanatory variable could lead to spurious results
if CARDS is included.57
Moreover, the CARDS results have not been consistently replicated in
other Lipitor diabetes-related studies. A separate report on women diabetics
from the Lipitor ASCOT study yielded results that were not close to statisti-
cally significant.58 In another Lipitor diabetes study, no significant benefit
was found, even in the combined group of men and women.59 In a Lipitor
study of diabetics on hemodialysis, no significant benefit was found in the
combined group of men and women.60 In a study of patients with renal
failure, Lipitor was not significantly beneficial with respect to cardiovascular
end points or survival; and results for women were less favorable than those
for men.61
Studies using other statins, including non-primary-prevention studies
and one branch of the HPS study, report results for diabetic women. Like
57This seems to have occurred in Thavendiranathan et al., supra note 13, at 2310 (“reductions
in the risk of major coronary events from statin therapy were significantly associated with . . . a
smaller proportion of men in the study population (p = .003)”).
58Peter S. Sever et al., Reduction in Cardiovascular Events with Atorvastatin in 2,532
Patients with Type 2 Diabetes, 28 Diabetes Care 1151, 1155 (2005) (reporting hazard ratio for
women for total cardiovascular events and procedures to be 0.90 (95% CI = 0.53 - 1.51;
p = 0.686)).
59Robert Knopp et al., Efficacy and Safety of Atorvastatin in the Prevention of Cardiovascular
End Points in Subjects with Type 2 Diabetes, 29 Diabetes Care 1478, 1483 (2006) (“the primary
end point . . . did not reach statistical significance”).
60Christoph Wanner et al., Atorvastatin in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus Undergoing
Hemodialysis, 353 New Eng. J. Med. 238, 238, 247 (2005) (“Atorvastatin had no statistically
significant effect on the composite primary end point of cardiovascular death, nonfatal myo-
cardial infarction, and stroke in patients with diabetes receiving hemodialysis”; authors con-
clude that treatment of studied group with statins “is not warranted” to reduce the primary
composite end point.”). See also Daniel M. Richie & Katie S. McClendon, Role of Statins for the
Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular Disease in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus, 64 Am.
J. Health-Syst. Pharm. 1603 (2007) (American Diabetes Association guidelines recommending
statin therapy “may be too aggressive”).
61B.G. Stegmayr et al., Low-Dose Atorvastatin in Severe Chronic Kidney Disease Patients:
A Randomized, Controlled Endpoint Study, 39 Scand. J. Urology & Nephrology 489
(2005).
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CARDS, they show a protective statin effect for CHD events.62 The implica-
tions of the HPS results are not clear because HPS results for diabetic women
are not separately reported for patients with and without prior CHD or
CVD.63 Nevertheless, CARDS, HPS, and other studies provide evidence that
diabetic patients can benefit from statin treatment. However, the incon-
sistent Lipitor-specific results and the potential confounding posed by
diabetes’ heart-related risks64 suggest caution in generalizing from statins’
beneficial effects for women diabetics to cardioprotection for women
patients in a pure primary prevention context or to a specific statin. The
absence of evidence of statins’ effectiveness in primary prevention nondia-
betic women, and the significant difference between men and women,
remain a concern in marketing statins to women.
V. Possible Violations of Federal and
State Law
We consider two kinds of amelioration with respect to Lipitor’s marketing.
First, we assess under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)65
the marketing of Lipitor as cardioprotective, without disclosing relevant
scientific information about women, If our scientific conclusions are valid,
the FDA should consider taking appropriate actions with respect to Pfizer’s
62HPS, supra note 25, at 2010 (fig. 3); Cholesterol Treatment Trialists’ (CTT) Collaborators,
Efficacy of Cholesterol-Lowering Therapy in 18686 People with Diabetes in 14 Randomised
Trials of Statins: A Meta-Analysis, 371 Lancet 117 (2008); João Costa et al., Efficacy of Lipid
Lowering Drug Treatment for Diabetic and Non-Diabetic Patients: Meta-Analysis of Ran-
domised Control Trials, 332 Brit. Med. J. 1115 (2006); Sandeep Vijan & Rodney A. Hayward,
Pharmacologic Lipid-Lowering Therapy in Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus: Background Paper for the
American College of Physicians, 140 Ann. Intern. Med. 650 (2004).
63Walsh & Pignone, supra note 12, at 2247 (tbl. 2), report a significant reduction for CHD events
in women in the HPS study. These data appear to be based on the diabetes female subgroup in
HPS. HPS, supra note 25 (fig. 3).
64Costa et al., supra note 62, show that diabetics are at increased risk of major coronary events
in statin studies in both primary prevention and secondary prevention contexts.
6521 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.; see Section V.A.
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advertising and labeling of Lipitor.66 Second, if we are correct, the question
arises whether women misled by Pfizer’s advertising have a legal cause of
action against Pfizer. Many women and their physicians undoubtedly were
influenced by Pfizer’s claims of protection against heart attacks,67 claims that
we do not believe to be consistent with the RCT evidence, especially
ASCOT’s Lipitor results. Pfizer’s advertising also does not disclose critical
portions of the Lipitor FDA-approved label, which acknowledges the absence
of evidence with respect to women. Whether women can recover depends
both on state law that might provide a cause of action, and on whether
federal law preempts state law actions.
A. Violation of the FDCA
Misleading or false advertisements violate the FDCA.68 The principal federal
regulation governing prescription drug advertisements divides advertising
characteristics into two classes, those that are false, unfair, or misleading and
those that may be false, unfair, or misleading. We address the two classes of
characteristics separately.
1. FDA Guidelines for Advertisements that are False, Unfair, or Misleading
FDA regulations state that advertisements for a prescription drug “are false,
lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading” if they have one or more of
20 enumerated characteristics.69 The first characteristic is that the advertis-
ing contains “a representation or suggestion, not approved or permitted for
use in the labeling, that a drug is . . . useful in a broader range of . . . patients
. . . than has been demonstrated by substantial evidence or substantial
66The FDCA authorizes a range of actions by the FDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 et seq.; Hutt et al.,
supra note 14, at 1196–1370.
67Advertising to consumers has been shown to have an effect on physician prescribing patterns.
Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and
Protecting the Public Health 159 (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton & Sheila P. Burke eds., 2007)
(citing five studies).
6821 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6). Misleading advertising is deemed to cause a drug to be misbranded
under the FDCA. Id., § 202.1(k). Introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of a misbranded drug is prohibited. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). Violation of § 331 is a
crime. Id.
6921 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(i)–(xx) (emphasis added).
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clinical experience.”70 The 18th characteristic is that the advertising “[u]ses
headline, subheadline, or pictorial or other graphic matter in a way that is
misleading.”71 The 20th characteristic is that the advertising “[r]epresents or
suggests that drug dosages properly recommended for use in the treatment
of certain classes of patients . . . are . . . effective for the treatment of other
classes of patients . . . when such is not the case.”72 Pfizer’s Lipitor advertising
may be false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading under each of
these criteria.
With respect to the first criterion, Lipitor’s approved label states that
cardioprotective “results for women were inconclusive.”73 Yet much of
Pfizer’s available advertising does not mention the inconclusive results. For
example, one Lipitor two-page advertisement in the magazine The New Yorker
states: “LIPITOR can lower the risk of heart attack . . . in patients who have
risk factors for heart disease.”74 The same advertisement does not indicate
that RCT results for most risk factors show no significant reduction in heart
attack risk for women, disclose the label’s information about inconclusive
results in women, or disclose that the principal underlying RCT stated that
no benefit was found for women.
A full-page Lipitor advertisement in the Wall Street Journal, a portion of
which appears in Figure 2, states in a large graphic and enormous font that
“Lipitor reduces the risk of heart attack by 36%.”75 The fine print states that
this statement is based on a large clinical study. The advertisement, includ-
ing the fine print, fails to state that what appears to be the same clinical study
produced insignificant, inconclusive, and possibly contrary results in women.
The ASCOT Lipitor study summarized in Table 2 expressly states, in discuss-
ing the primary end point (NFMI plus fatal CHD), “no benefit was apparent
7021 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(i).
7121 C.F.R. § 201(e)(6)(xviii).
7221 C.F.R. § 201(e)(6)(xix).
73Label, supra note 8, at 5.
74The New Yorker, Aug. 27, 2007.
75Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 2007.
Statins, Adverse Cardiovascular Events, and FDA Preemption Claims 527
among women.”76 Indeed, the ASCOT study reports that risk to women of
the primary end point increased in the relevant RCT trial.77 The increase was
not statistically significant but is important qualifying information in the
context of mass media advertising to consumers of a 36 percent decrease
without distinguishing between genders.
Similar questions arise with respect to Pfizer’s other advertising.
Pfizer’s Lipitor website communicates with consumers and states that, in
patients with multiple risk factors for heart disease, Lipitor is used to “reduce
the risk of heart attack.”78 It does not state that a measure of risk for women
actually increased in ASCOT, the key RCT trial, or that the published
ASCOT article stated that no benefit for women was found with respect to
NFMI or fatal CHD. A key component of Pfizer’s television advertising,
removed from the market after assertions were made that is was misleading
on grounds not addressed here,79 includes a graphic in which Dr. Robert
Jarvik states that Lipitor is “FDA-approved to reduce the risk of heart
76Sever et al., supra note 9, at 1153. The study does report “no significant interaction between
sex and impact of statin on the primary endpoint,” id., but that obviously does not establish a
protective effect for women when “no benefit” was found for women with respect to the primary
end point. The insignificant interaction could readily be explicable by sample size.
77Id. at 1155 (tbl. 4).
78See 〈http://www.lipitor.com/learn-about-lipitor/home.jsp〉, accessed Jan. 11, 2008.
79Saul, supra note 6.
Figure 2: Lipitor advertisement.
528 Eisenberg and Wells
attack.”80 The oral message is accompanied by a visual image consisting of a
large piece of paper that also states that Lipitor is “FDA-approved to reduce
the risk of heart attack.” The television commercial does not report the
increased risk to women in ASCOT or that Pfizer’s FDA-approved label states
that the results for women are inconclusive.
The advertising thus might reasonably be interpreted to suggest, con-
trary to the label’s report of inconclusive scientific evidence, that Lipitor is
useful in a broader range of patients “than has been demonstrated by
substantial evidence or substantial clinical experience.” This would violate
the FDCA.
With respect to the 18th criterion, some of Lipitor’s television adver-
tising graphically emphasizes the reduction in heart problems found in a
study, but neither the graphic, nor the voiceover, nor the text of the televi-
sion advertisement indicates that no significant reduction in the primary end
point was found for women. Similar omissions apply to print advertising for
Lipitor, such as the Wall Street Journal advertisement in Figure 2. The Lipitor
advertising program thus may use “headline, subheadline, or pictorial or
other graphic matter in a way that is misleading.”
With respect to the 20th criterion, Lipitor advertising repeatedly fails to
report that clinical results were statistically significant for men but not for
women and that the ASCOT results tended to go in the opposite direction
for women. The advertising therefore may be interpreted to suggest “that
drug dosages properly recommended for use in the treatment of certain
classes of patients . . . are . . . effective for the treatment of other classes of
patients . . . when such is not the case.”
The advertising’s failure to distinguish between men and women is
exacerbated by its express reference to pregnant women. The advertising
regularly states that pregnant women should not take Lipitor. A woman
seeing the advertising might well conclude that appropriate female-specific
disclosures had been made. Lipitor’s label’s express reference to inconclu-
sive results in women suggests that the company and the FDA regarded
Lipitor’s lack of demonstrated efficacy in women to be important.
The three above-discussed characteristics relate to whether advertise-
ments “are” false and misleading under FDA criteria. If the characteristics
exist, there appears to be no discretion under FDA regulations not to find
the advertisements to be false or misleading.
80Lipitor advertisement, WCBS television, aired in New York market on Nov. 4, 2007, and on
many other dates.
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2. FDA Guidelines for Advertisements that May be False, Unfair,
or Misleading
The relevant FDA regulation also states that advertisements “may be false,
lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading” if they have one or more of
13 additional enumerated characteristics.81 The prohibited characteristics
include some that may apply to advertising for Lipitor.
An advertisement may be false and misleading if it:
Contains favorable information or conclusions from a study that is inadequate in
design, scope, or conduct to furnish significant support for such information or
conclusions.82
Lipitor advertising’s non-gender-qualified statements about reduction of
heart attack risk are based on a study that Pfizer’s label acknowledges was
inconclusive about women. The favorable statements, such as the statement
about 36 percent reduction in heart attack risk, are thus based on a study
that is inadequate to support the statement in the case of women, who
obviously constitute a huge fraction of the target audience.
FDA regulations also state that an advertisement may be false and
misleading if it:
Uses reports or statements represented to be statistical analyses, interpretations,
or evaluations that are inconsistent with or violate the established principles of
statistical theory, methodology, applied practice, and inference, or that are
derived from clinical studies the design, data, or conduct of which substantially
invalidate the application of statistical analyses, interpretations, or evaluations.83
The Lipitor advertising about heart attack risk contains a statement repre-
sented to be “statistical analyses, interpretations, or evaluations,” such as the
statement about a 36 percent reduction in heart attack risk, but the failure of
the advertising to differentiate between heterogeneous subgroups—men
and women—raises the question of whether the advertising is “inconsistent
with” and violates “established principles of statistical theory, methodology,
applied practice, and inference.” The information contained within the
ASCOT study allowed researchers to distinguish between results for men and
8121 C.F.R. § 201(e)(7) (emphasis added).
8221 C.F.R. § 201(e)(7)(i).
8321 C.F.R. § 201(e)(7)(v).
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women. As Figure 1 and Table 2 show, the ASCOT study showed a statisti-
cally significant reduction in risk for men and a statistically insignificant
increase in risk for women. This pattern or similar patterns exist for every
other RCT study analyzed here. Failure to tailor advertising to reflect this
material difference could be regarded as not consistent with either everyday
prudence or statistical methodology.
B. Violations of State Law: Lipitor Lawsuits and Mismarketing
Although we have not surveyed the full range of Lipitor-related legal actions
or available causes of action, allegations in lawsuits are consistent with our
meta-analyses and our FDCA analysis. One lawsuit, brought by a former
Pfizer marketing employee, provides specific allegations of mismarketing to
women based on specific female age and risk features and recommendations
by Pfizer software or personnel.84
Allegations in another lawsuit also assert the overmarketing of Lipitor.
Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc. suggests the importance of a 2004 FDA-approved label-
ing change for Lipitor. Lipitor had, in the 1990s, been approved to reduce
cholesterol.85 On July 30, 2004, Lipitor was first approved by the FDA “for the
prevention of cardiovascular disease in certain patients.”86 The additional
84Dr. Jesse Polansky is a former Pfizer employee who is said in a lawsuit complaint to have had
responsibility for evaluating the integrity of Pfizer marketing programs. Dr. Polansky is
described as follows.
From April 2001 until July 2003, Dr. Polansky was employed by Pfizer in New York City as
Director of Outcomes Management Strategies. Dr. Polansky also served as the medical
director for the Local Marketing Team Review Committee that evaluates and approves the
regulatory, legal, and scientific integrity of marketing programs for Pfizer’s major metro-
politan markets.
Third Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. Dr. Jesse Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04 CV
0704 (ERK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007), at 4–5, ¶ 9. The allegations in Dr. Polansky’s complaint
contain at least two concrete illustrations of mismarketing Lipitor to women based on inad-
equate scientific support. First, a software program distributed by Pfizer allegedly recommends
medication for a hypothetical 43-year-old female with several heart disease risk factors when the
guidelines of the NCEP do not recommend medication. Id. at 29–30, ¶¶ 90–94. Second, a Pfizer
representative recommends statin therapy outside the same guidelines in a case study of a
74-year-old female. Id. at 49, ¶ 150.
85Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
86Id.; Letter from David Orloff to Pfizer Inc., re NDA 20-702/S-039, July 30, 2004.
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labeling approval was for reducing the risk of heart attacks in “adults without
clinically evident coronary heart disease, but with multiple risk factors for
coronary heart disease, such as age 55 years, smoking, hypertension, low
HDL-C, or a family history of early coronary heart disease.”87 That approval
was based on the ASCOT study.88 In Prohias, it was alleged, as our meta-
analyses suggest, that no evidence exists that Lipitor’s ability to reduce
cholesterol “has any effect on the development of coronary heart dis-
ease . . . or mortality rates for women.”89
Before the 2004 labeling change allowing claims of cardioprotection,
at least some of Pfizer’s advertising expressly disclaimed the existence of
evidence that Lipitor prevented heart problems. Advertisements stated,
“Lipitor has not been shown to prevent heart disease or heart attacks.”90 This
disclaimer generated judicial skepticism in Prohias about the viability of a
class action against Pfizer based on misleading heart-protective advertising
before July 2004.91 The Prohias court further found that “Pfizer’s post-July
2004 advertisements were not misleading as a matter of law” because of the
FDA label approval with respect to Lipitor’s reduction of heart attack risks.92
This legal conclusion is scientifically questionable in the context of an action
by women because the studies indicating no significant CHD or NFMI effect
for women were available before the 2004 labeling change.
The Prohias court’s legal conclusion is also questionable because it
ignores the FDA’s own standards regulating advertising. As shown above,
Pfizer’s advertising appears to be inconsistent with several express FDA
87485 F. Supp. 2d at 1331–32 (quoting Complaint).
88Orloff Letter, supra note 86.
89Complaint, Nilda Prohias and Moses Selesky, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 05-22658 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2005), at 2, ¶ 8.
90Lipitor advertising reproduced in Complaint, supra note 89, at 34, 42, 44, 47, ¶¶ 84, 99, 104,
106.
91Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1235 (S.D. Fla. 2007):
I do, however, have serious doubts about whether the plaintiffs can succeed in presenting
evidence of misleading advertisements because most of the advertisements included in the
complaint specifically state that Lipitor “has not been shown to prevent heart disease or
heart attacks,” see Complaint at ¶¶ 89, 101, 106, and those advertisements are not mislead-
ing as a matter of law because they substantially comport with the FDA approved label.
92490 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
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advertising regulations. The advertising regulations do not protect the
content of all advertising once a label is approved. Advertising content
should not materially differ from key information approved in the label. The
Lipitor label approved by the FDA does not appear to be consistent with
Pfizer’s Lipitor advertising program because the advertising does not
acknowledge the absence of evidence of benefit for women. In Prohias,
contrary to the court’s conclusion, no apparent conflict exists between state
law advertising claims and FDA labeling approval because much of the
advertising program appears to have omitted material information included
in the label. The court’s assertion that “the alleged advertisements derive
from, and largely comport with, the approved label”93 seems incorrect with
respect to women because the label notes the absence of evidence with
respect to women and the advertising does not.
Even if Prohias were correct with respect to advertising as of the time of
the Prohias complaint, Pfizer’s subsequent advertising was arguably more
aggressively misleading. For example, the prominent “36%” graphic shown
in Figure 2 was part of a later Lipitor campaign. Its quantitative statement is
affirmatively misleading with respect to women based on the ASCOT results.
This and similar advertising were not identified as a source of Pfizer’s alleged
misbehavior in Prohias94 and appear not to have been used by Pfizer until
later.95
VI. Preemption
The Prohias Lipitor ruling is understandable in that courts do not wish to
substitute their medical “judgment for the FDA’s about these medical
issues,”96 but this deference, however desirable as a matter of legal doctrine,
is usually shown in the context of failure to warn about the safety risks of
drugs or medical devices when those risks have been addressed by the FDA
via its consideration of a drug’s label or premarketing approval of a medical
93Id. at 1234.
94Complaint, supra note 89.
95See Saul, supra note 6 (“Pfizer has spent more than $258 million advertising Lipitor since
January 2006, most of it on the Jarvik campaign”).
96Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
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device.97 Whatever one’s view of the FDA’s preemptive authority with respect
to safety warnings and labeling, a matter we discuss below,98 it is more
difficult to regard FDA scientific activity, or absence of activity, as protective
of all possible marketing claims. The possible range of misleading claims is
too vast to anticipate. Prominent commentators, including two former FDA
Chief Counsels, have noted that the “primary problems posed by advertising
for prescription drugs . . . do not appear easily redressable by the authority
to issue regulations or, indeed, to invoke the informal enforcement sanc-
tions provided by the FD&C Act.”99 Traditional civil enforcement methods,
such a private party actions, thus should be more reluctantly preempted in
the area of questionable advertising.
97Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (premarket approved medical devices). In the
area of drugs, compare Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 31 (2007); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
501 F. Supp. 2d 776 (E.D. La. 2007) (FDA entitled to limited deference); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Barnhill v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc., 2007 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 44718 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007); Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666
(E.D. Ky. 2006); Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Jackson v.
Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Neb. 2006); Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm., Inc., 2006 WL
901657 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2006); McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 05-1286, 2005 WL 3752269
(D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2005), stay granted, motion to certify appeal granted, 2006 WL 2819046 (D.N.J. Sept.
29, 2006); Ferrari v. American Home Prods. Corp., 2007 WL1933129 (Ga. App. July 5, 2007)
(vaccine case); Kelly v. Wyeth, 2007 WL 1302589 (Mass. Super. Apr. 12, 2007); Strong v.
American Cyanamid Co., 2007 WL 2445938 (Mo. App. Aug. 28, 2007), cause ordered transferred to
Mo. S. Ct. (Dec. 18, 2007); In re Vioxx Litig., Nos. ATL-L-3553-05-MT & ATL-L-1296-05-MT, slip
op. (N.J. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007); Deutsch v. Wyeth, Inc., 2007 WL 2060072 (N.J. Super. June 22,
2007); Cona v. Merck & Co., Nos. ATL-L-3553-05, ATL-L-1296-05 (N.J. Super. June 8, 2007);
Coutu v. Tracy, 2006 WL 1314261 (R.I. Super. May 11, 2006); Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 WL 3041078
(Vt. Oct. 27, 2006), petition for cert. filed (No. 06-1249), 75 U.S.L.W. 3500 (2007), with Tucker v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 1:04-cv-1748-DFH-WTL, slip op. at *12 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19,
2007) (“particularly clear showing of conflict” supports preemption); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc.,
2007WL 2463378 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2007) (vaccine case); In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 495 F. Supp.
2d 977 (D. Minn. 2007); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306–17 (E.D. Pa. 2007);
In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL 1699, 2006 WL 2374742,
at **5–12 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 16, 2006); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523–38 (E.D.
Pa. 2006); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 2006 WL 2692469 (Cal. Super. Sept. 15, 2006); Prohias v.
AstraZeneca Pharms., L.P., 958 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. App. 2007); Abramowitz v. Cephalon, Inc.,
2006 WL 560639 (N.J. Super. Mar. 3, 2006); Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 810 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2006) (vaccine case); Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., 2007 WL 1181991 (Tex. Dist. Apr. 20,
2007); Brockert v. Wyeth Pharms., 2007 WL 2077554 (Tex. Dist. Jan. 31, 2007); Price v. Cook,
2007 WL 2154766 (W. Va. Cir. July 9, 2007).
98See Section VI.E.
99Hutt et al., supra note 14, at 541–42.
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Thus, despite FDA approval of labeling language that might be inter-
preted as covering some of the content in an advertisement, that approval
does not reasonably support legal protection via preemption. One possible
standard is that no implied preemption exists when (1) a company knew or
should have known that its marketing is misleading under state or federal
law, (2) the advertising omits material scientific information included in the
label that pertains to a large segment of the targeted audience, and (3) the
allegedly misleading aspect of the advertising has not been expressly
addressed by the FDA.
Analysis of Lipitor’s advertising has implications for the broader pre-
emption issues relating to safety warnings and a regulatory compliance
defense. Our evaluation of the FDA’s regulation of the world’s best-selling
drug suggests that preemption arguments should include consideration of
actual agency performance rather than adhere to the legal literature’s domi-
nant practice of focusing primarily on theoretical institutional competence.
A. FDA Regulation of Advertising Compared to Labeling and Warnings
Although the FDA specifically approves or is notified of changes to drug
labels,100 no systematic program requires explicit FDA judgment about the
content of all consumer advertising. For most prescription drugs, no require-
ment exists that companies submit promotional materials to the FDA before
using them.101 Rather, materials are submitted at the time of the drug’s initial
marketing.102 However, mere submission and the FDA’s silence as to a
100The FDA permits two kinds of labeling supplements:
(1) Prior approval supplements, which require FDA approval before a change is made (§§
314.70(b) and 601.12(f)(1)); and (2) “changes being effected” (CBE) supplements, which
may be implemented before FDA approval, but after FDA notification (§§ 314.70(c) and
601.12(f)(2)).
FDA, supra note 15, at 3934, 2006 WL 160271. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70, 514.8, 601.12; 72 Fed.
Reg. 73589–73602, 2007 WL 4555142.
101Consumer-Directed Promotion of Regulated Medical Products; Public Hearing, 70 Fed. Reg.
54054, 54059 (Sept. 13, 2005); Hutt et al., supra note 14, at 558 (noting that FDA did not require
premarket review of consumer advertising but encouraged this approach through the use of
warning letters); Institute of Medicine, supra note 67, at 158–64 (reviewing history of FDA
advertising regulation).
10221 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3)(i); 70 Fed. Reg. at 54059.
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particular advertisement does not establish that the FDA determined that
the advertisement was not deceptive.103
Although advertising can communicate safety information, its primary
purpose is to expand a drug’s market, not to communicate safety informa-
tion.104 The FDA can advise companies on proposed advertising but, absent
limited circumstances, it is the drug company’s decision whether to seek
advance FDA input on the advertising,105 other than advertising in connec-
tion with initial marketing of the drug.106 According to the FDCA, “except in
extraordinary circumstances,” the FDA cannot issue a regulation that
requires “prior approval by the Secretary of the content of any advertise-
ment.”107 The FDA office responsible for reviewing consumer advertising has
been described by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies as
“small” and with “limited resources.”108 In 2004, only 32 percent of broadcast
advertising underwent FDA review before airing.109 FDA warning letters
about questionable advertising are frequently sent to drug companies long
after the advertising campaign is over.110
103In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL 1699, 2006 WL
2374742, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006).
104See, e.g., Agency Information Collection Activities; Submission for Office of Management and
Budget Review; Comment Request; Experimental Evaluation of Variations in Content and
Format of the Brief Summary in Direct-to-Consumer Print Advertisements for Prescription
Drugs, 72 Fed. Reg. 11889, 11889 (Mar. 14, 2007) (“Although advertising of prescription drugs
was once primarily addressed to health professionals, increasingly consumers have become a
target audience, as DTC advertising has dramatically increased in the past few years. . . . Fre-
quently, sponsors print in small type, verbatim, the risk-related sections of the approved product
labeling (also called the package insert, professional labeling, or prescribing information). This
labeling is written for health professionals, using medical terminology.”); Pennsylvania Employ-
ees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca Inc., 499 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2007) (advertising’s “primary
purpose—unlike labeling—is not to promote safety but rather to promote market expansion”).
10521 C.F.R. § 202.1(j)(4).
10621 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3)(i).
10721 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3)(A).
108Institute of Medicine, supra note 67, at 163.
109Julie M. Donohue, Marisa Cevasco & Meredith B. Rosenthal, A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 673, 679 (2007).
110Id.
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The FDA itself does not regard advertising and safety warning issues as
being similarly situated with respect to preemption. The FDA’s 2006 state-
ments in its regulatory preamble about preemption of state law actions focus
primarily on labeling and warning issues, not on misleading advertising
issues.111 The FDA preamble that argues for broad preemption specifically
relates to labeling. The document’s title is “Requirement and Content and
Format of Labeling . . . .”112 The FDA’s preamble expressly indicates that
advertising issues are beyond its scope.113
To the extent the FDA’s preamble mentions advertising, allowing
recovery on the basis of misleading advertising need not implicate the FDA’s
concerns. The FDA opposes state laws that “compel a firm to include in
labeling or advertising a statement that FDA has considered and found
scientifically unsubstantiated” as well as state laws that “preclude a firm from
including in labeling or advertising a statement that is included in prescrip-
tion drug labeling.”114
In the case of Lipitor, accurately describing what we believe to be the
evidence about the absence of Lipitor’s cardioprotection of women does not
“compel a firm to include in . . . advertising a statement that FDA has con-
sidered and found scientifically unsubstantiated.” The FDA could not have
concluded that advertising acknowledging the absence of evidence of pro-
tection of women is unsubstantiated because the label it approved states that
the evidence with respect to women was inconclusive. It is therefore scien-
tifically unsupportable to argue that the FDA found the absence of evidence
of cardioprotection for females to be “scientifically unsubstantiated.” The
absence of evidence of protection for women exists in relevant RCT studies
for reasonably healthy females, including the ASCOT Lipitor study. State
111See generally WilliamW. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/
Ceiling Distinction, 82 NYU L. Rev. 1547 (2007); Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied
Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 Boston Coll. L. Rev. 1089 (2007); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56
DePaul L. Rev. 227 (2007).
112FDA, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
113“The agency agrees that advertising and promotional labeling regulations address product
promotion issues and that this final rule is not an appropriate context for discussion of these
issues.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 3953.
11471 Fed. Reg. at 3935.
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laws requiring advertising to disclose the state of research with respect to
female cardioprotection would not implicate the FDA’s inclusion concern
with respect to advertising.
Nor would advertising disclosing the absence of evidence with respect
to women implicate the FDA’s exclusion concern. A problem with Lipitor
consumer advertising appears to be that the huge female consumer audi-
ence is not told the labeling information that it clearly would be interested
in. Lipitor’s label acknowledges the absence of evidence of protection for
women, but Lipitor’s advertising lacks such acknowledgment. A state legal
standard requiring advertising to acknowledge the absence of evidence for
women would therefore not preclude advertising from containing a labeling
statement. It would require that label-related statements in advertising not
be misleading.115 The FDA’s preamble’s other references to advertising
assert preemption only with respect to failure to warn issues, not misleading
advertising claims.116
If no persuasive scientific evidence supports the claim that Lipitor
reduces fatal CHD or NFMI in women, and such evidence was available to
Pfizer before the 2004 labeling change, then one might conclude that Pfizer
knew or should have known that its unqualified express heart attack adver-
tising claims could materially mislead consumers.117
115Requiring advertising to include labeling information that is omitted from advertising but
necessary to avoid misleading consumers would not appear to fall within the FDA’s asserted
preemption of “claims that a drug’s sponsor breached an obligation to plaintiff by making
statements that FDA approved for inclusion in the drug’s label.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 3936. State-
ments approved for labels can obviously be misleading if they are de-coupled from important
qualifications in the labels but omitted from the advertising.
116FDA believes that at least the following claims would be preempted by its regulation
of prescription drug labeling: . . . (2) claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to
warn by failing to include in an advertisement any information the substance of which
appears anywhere in the labeling . . . (4) claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to
warn by failing to include a statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which
had been proposed to FDA for inclusion in labeling, if that statement was not required by
FDA at the time plaintiff claims the sponsor had an obligation to warn (unless FDA has
made a finding that the sponsor withheld material information relating to the proposed
warning before plaintiff claims the sponsor had the obligation to warn); (5) claims that a
drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to include in labeling or in advertising
a statement the substance of which FDA has prohibited in labeling or advertising . . . .
71 Fed. Reg. at 3935–36 (emphases added).
117Pfizer targets consumers in its advertising, so the learned intermediary doctrine, see, e.g.,
Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980) (“manufacturer’s duty is to warn
538 Eisenberg and Wells
If we have accurately described the relevant science and the contents of
the Lipitor label and advertising, it is not reasonable to interpret the FDA’s
approval of cardioprotective language in the Lipitor label as protecting
against actions based on misleading advertising. The FDA cannot reasonably
be regarded as having addressed that issue or the untold number of other
issues that might arise in a company’s translation of FDA label approval into
an advertising campaign. No systematic program requires express FDA con-
sideration and approval of all of the content of all advertising.118 Nor is it
clear that such a mandated systematic program would be desirable. The
FDA’s limited resources likely should be primarily focused on scientific
review, not marketing claims.
B. Are State Law Actions Based on Misleading Advertising Preempted?
Given the FDA’s limited role with respect to advertising, courts generally
have not found the FDCA-FDA regulatory scheme to preempt actions based
on false or misleading advertising. In a variety of contexts, courts have found
the doctor, not the patient”); Bukowski v. CooperVision Inc., 592 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. App. Div.
3d Dept. 1993), which focuses on information communicated to professionals, may not be
regarded as a complete defense to misleading consumer advertising actions. See State ex rel.
Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007); Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734
A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). But see Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(pre-Karl case finding Perez was an isolated decision); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d
514, 547 n.30 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (dicta); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 812
n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Cf. Vitanza v. Upjohn, 214 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting Perez ). It
is difficult to rely on the learned intermediary doctrine in the face of knowledge that advertising
to consumers has been shown to have an effect on physician prescribing patterns. Note 67 supra.
In any event, Pfizer’s information for physicians appears to incompletely describe the state of
scientific knowledge with respect to cardioprotective effects on women. Qualifications appear to
be incompletely offered to the medical community through the Lipitor label, which claims that
results for women are inconclusive, text accompanying note 8 supra, but even there Pfizer does
not acknowledge to physicians the absence of heart attack evidence for females by statins across
RCT studies or the increased risk for women found in the ASCOT study. Nor does Pfizer include
relevant information from the CASHMERE study, discussed in Section IV, which found no
significant arterial thickening benefit for postmenopausal women.
118The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-85, § 901(d)(2),
121 Stat. 939, Sept. 27, 2007, contains a provision under which regulators “may require the
submission of any television advertisement for a drug . . . for review . . . not later than 45 days
before dissemination of the television advertisement.” The provision is codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 353b(a).
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state consumer protection and related laws not to be preempted.119 Where
plaintiffs seek advertising disclosures that parallel those on an FDA-approved
label, no conflict exists between the FDA’s scientific judgment and state law
causes of action. Both the FDA and the courts recognize the absence of
conflict and reject preemption. Courts state that requirements consistent
with the label create no conflict.120 The FDA agrees.
FDA recognizes that FDA’s regulation of drug labeling will not preempt all State
law actions. The Supreme Court has held that certain state law requirements that
parallel FDA requirements may not be preempted. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 495 . . . (1996) (holding that the presence of a State law damages
remedy for violations of FDA requirements does not impose an additional
requirement upon medical device manufacturers but “merely provides another
reason for manufacturers to comply with federal law”).121
Courts rule against preemption of advertising in part on the ground that the
FDA claims no complete preemption in this context.122
These rulings comport with the customary approach to preemption.
Unlike the situation with respect to premarketing approval of medical
devices,123 legislation cannot be interpreted to have mandated preemption
in the FDA-advertising context. Given congressional silence, a presumption
119Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (sustaining pre-2004 state
law advertising claims against Pfizer against preemption defense); In re Medtronic, Inc.,
Implantable Defribillator Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 886, 898 (D. Minn. 2006) (rejecting preemp-
tion claim with respect to advertising); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod.
Liab. Litig. MDL 1699, 2006 WL 2374742, at *11, 12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006). See also Mylan
Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1993) (allowing false representation claims
with respect to drugs to proceed under the Lanham Act); Midlothian Labs., L.L.C. v. Pamlab,
L.L.C., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1085–86 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (no preemption in part because FDCA
is primarily concerned with safety and efficacy of drugs while Lanham Act focuses on truth or
falsity of advertising claims); Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., 933 F.
Supp. 918, 933 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“false statements are actionable under the Lanham Act, even
if their truth may be generally within the purview of the FDA”).
120Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
121Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Bio-
logical Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922–4001, 2006 WL 160271.
122Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 1233; In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices
& Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL 1699, 2006 WL 2374742 at *11 (“when the FDA believes that its
regulations preempt state law it says so”).
123Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
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exists favoring the validity of exercises of the states’ historical police
powers.124 No preemption provision appears in the prescription drug pro-
visions of the FDCA.125 In fact, a clause preserves state law claims.126
C. Claims Attacking Advertising Consistent with Labels May be Preempted
At least one case has found state advertising law to be preempted when state
law requirements would conflict with the FDA-approved label. In Pennsylva-
nia Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca Inc.,127 plaintiffs sued pharmaceutical
companies (Zeneca) alleging that a marketing campaign for the acid reflux
disease drug, Nexium, was deceptive because it misleadingly advertised
Nexium as an improvement on another reflux drug, Prilosec (omeprazole).
Zeneca obtained FDA approval for the Nexium label. The label reported the
results of four studies comparing the healing rate for Nexium compared to
Prilosec. After eight weeks of treatment, all four studies showed a higher rate
of healing on Nexium than on Prilosec, though most of the differences were
not statistically significant.128 The approved label thus included data support-
ing, albeit modestly, the advertising.
This consistency between the advertising and the approved label was
the core of Zeneca’s preemption defense.129 Allowing a state law cause of
124E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system,
[it] ha[s] long [been] presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action.”).
12521 U.S.C. §§ 301–397.
126The Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962), states:
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
shall be construed as invalidating any provision of State law which would be valid in the
absence of such amendments unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such
amendments and such provision of State law.
See Sharkey, supra note 111, at 241 n.80.
127499 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2007).
128Nexium Label, NDA 21-153/S-020, June 6, 2005, at 9–10, available at 〈http://www.fda.gov/
MEDwatch/SAFETY/2005/Jun_PI/Nexium_PI.pdf〉, accessed Jan. 11, 2008.
129Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, Pennsylvania Employee
Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., Civ. No. 05-075-SLR, filed July 1, 2005, at 13–16 (“the
FDA-approved Nexium labeling conveys the very same message” of Nexium’s superiority over
Prilosec).
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action to deem the advertising misleading would have implicated the FDA’s
conclusion that the label was sufficiently accurate to merit approval.
Faced with this situation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, over a dissent, applied “implied conflict preemption” to preclude a
state law cause of action based on allegedly misleading Nexium advertising.
Implied conflict preemption invalidates state laws when, despite no congres-
sional command, state law conflicts with federal law.130 The Third Circuit
relied in part on the comprehensiveness of FDA regulation of labeling and
advertising.131 The specific conflict identified in the case was that “FDA-
approved labeling is the basis for allegedly fraudulent representations made
in prescription drug advertising.”132 Although the Third Circuit opinion is
phrased broadly, the facts of the case may support a finding of a state-federal
conflict.
The situation appears to differ with respect to Lipitor’s advertising. The
FDA-approved Lipitor label included information noting the absence of
evidence with respect to women. Pfizer’s advertising did not disclose differ-
ences between male and female results in its own or other statin studies, or
that the Lipitor ASCOT study showed increased risk to women, or that the
Lipitor CASHMERE study found no significant effect on arterial thickening
in reasonably healthy women. Although advertising cannot be expected to
include all of the detail in a label, a state might reasonably conclude that it
is misleading to fail to disclose in advertising that the claimed cardioprotec-
tive effect rests on no RCT scientific support with respect to a substantial part
(the female part) of the target audience.
For preemption purposes, the Lipitor situation therefore differs from
Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust. There, the challenged advertising with
respect to Nexium was based on key information in the FDA-approved label.
To find a false advertising cause of action preempted in the case of Lipitor,
one would have to conclude that the label revealing the absence of results for
women is somehow inconsistent with a state law cause of action based on
advertising that failed to reveal the absence of results for women. There is no
federal-state conflict.
130Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
131499 F.3d at 247–52.
132Id. at 251.
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A broader reading of Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust is independent
of the labeling-advertising facts in the case. That broader view is that the
FDA’s substantial scheme of drug regulation preempts all state law claims
without regard to the content of the FDA-approved label or the content of
the advertising. The discussion above suggests that this reading is inconsis-
tent with relevant preemption doctrine. Neither Congress nor the FDA
support such a broad view of preemption. Such a reading would unduly fail
to discourage misleading advertising. If preemption nullifies all state law
causes of action regardless of advertising’s content, then drug advertising is
not bound by the label except in cases where the FDA chooses to intervene.
A manufacturer’s advertising could falsely claim that a drug cures many
diseases, and millions of people could seek, and some obtain, the drug
because of the advertising. The FDA could require the manufacturer to
change its advertising or otherwise seek enforcement, but misled consumers
would have no basis on which to recover their money at their option.
D. Implications of the Statin Experience for Preemption
The Lipitor advertising experience provides evidence bearing on broader
preemption issues. Debate exists about whether the FDA satisfactorily
enforces its statutory mandates133 and whether greater institutional agency
competence should trump judicial action.134 This study supplies information
about whether FDA institutional competence is so superior as to warrant
precluding state enforcement activity.
133Compare, e.g., Institute of Medicine, supra note 6; Curt D. Furberg et al., The FDA and Drug
Safety, 166 Arch. Internal Med. 1938 (2006); U.S. House Committee on Gov. Reform—Minority
Staff Special Investigations Division, Prescription for Harm: The Decline in FDA Enforcement
Activity (June 2006) (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman), available at 〈http://
oversight.house.gov/documents/20060627101434-98349.pdf〉, accessed Jan. 13, 2008, with FDA
White Paper, Protecting the Public Health: FDA Pursues an Aggressive Enforcement Strategy
(June 2003), available at 〈http://www.fda.gov/oc/whitepapers/enforce.html〉, accessed Jan. 13,
2008.
134Compare, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of
Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. Tort L. art. 5 (2006), available at
〈http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss1/art5〉; Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Law
in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, Roger Williams L. Rev. (2008) (forthcoming), with
Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort LawMeets the Administrative State, 1 J. Tort
L. art. 4, 3 (2006), available at 〈http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss1/art4〉; Catherine M.
Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State
Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & Pol’y 1013 (2007).
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1. Preemption and the Lipitor Advertising
Statins, including Lipitor, are among the world’s most widely used drugs,
with cumulative sales of tens of billions of dollars. Yet for years Pfizer appears
to have been able to advertise Lipitor’s cardioprotective effect without
including material scientific information relevant to millions of consumers.
The world’s top-selling drug’s consumer advertising about efficacy likely
was inadequately regulated by the FDA. This questionable regulation has
occurred notwithstanding concrete evidence, consistently available at least
since 2004, that clinical trials do not support claims of cardioprotection for
women in a primary prevention context.135 If the FDA has not adequately
regulated a highly visible drug with an enormous audience, one might be
skeptical about regulation of less visible drugs with smaller potential patient
populations. This study’s findings thus suggest that preempting traditional
advertising regulation is questionable not simply because courts have tradi-
tional expertise in addressing claims of fraud and misleading sales practices,
and in balancing the interests at stake with respect to commercial speech.
Preemption is doubtful policy because the underlying assumption—
sufficient institutional competence to sufficiently monitor and discipline—
may be inaccurate. State law causes of action continue to have an important
policy role in generating proper incentives to communicate accurately with
consumers.
2. Implications of the Lipitor Experience for Broader
Preemption Questions
This Lipitor case study also has implications for preemption debates beyond
advertising—debates about warnings and defenses based on compliance with
FDA rules. Legal analyses of these matters generally do not account for the
reality of FDA performance. As exemplified here and elsewhere, that per-
formance is sometimes seriously incomplete.136 In addition to the Lipitor
instance of questionably managing one of the world’s most visible drugs,
specific instances of the drug regulatory system’s inadequacy have long been
135Walsh & Pignone, supra note 12.
136Furberg et al., supra note 133; Curt D. Furberg, Decisions by Regulatory Agencies: Are They
Evidence Based? 8 Trials 13 (2007).
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recognized.137 At times, critics regard the FDA as having been more protec-
tive of industry than of the public.138
Bottom-line analyses that go beyond anecdotal information are
troublesome. The FDA maintains an Adverse Event Reporting System
(AERS) that includes drug reaction reports from manufacturers, health-care
professionals, and consumers.139 Analysis of AERS from 1998 through 2005
shows reported serious adverse drug events increasing by 260 percent from
34,966 to 89,842.140 Fatal adverse drug events increased by 270 percent from
5,519 to 15,107 and far outpaced the growth in the number of prescrip-
tions.141 Based on these data, analysts concluded that there was a “marked
increase in reported deaths and serious injuries associated with drug therapy
over the study period.”142
In exploring the sources of limited FDA performance, Furberg et al.
and others highlight several FDA and AERS features that resonate with the
possible mismarketing of Lipitor. In this respect our findings add weight to
the views of those concerned about inadequate FDA performance and the
undesirability of foreclosing supplementary remedies via state law in nonad-
vertising contexts. At least three concerns about FDA regulation of safety
matters seem supported by analogous findings in this study. These concerns
relate to study design, regulation of postmarketing behavior, and limited
expertise and resources.
137Thomas J. Moore, Deadly Medicine: Why Tens of Thousands of Heart Patients Died in
America’s Worst Drug Disaster (1995).
138Devra Davis, The Secret History of the War on Cancer 236, 420 (2007) (FDA recommends a
limit for exposure to carcinogens in food additives and adhesives but not in bubble bath used
on children and tells consumers to seek manufacturer guarantee of level being below FDA-
recommended level; FDA approval of aspartame plagued with conflicts of interest); Teresa
Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1335, 1348–52
(1993); see Institute of Medicine, supra note 67, at 73–74 (reviewing concerns about agency
capture).
13921 C.F.R. § 314.80; 〈http://www.fda.gov/cder/aers/default.htm〉; 〈http://www.fda.gov/
medwatch/index.html〉 (both accessed Mar. 8, 2008).
140Thomas J. Moore, M.R. Cohen & C.D. Furberg, Serious Adverse Drug Events Reported to the
Food and Drug Administration, 1998–2005, 167 Arch. Internal Med. 1752 (2007).
141Id.
142Id.
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First, study design problems at the preapproval stage are said to permit
serious, uncommon adverse events to go undetected.143 Study design
limitations—in particular, too few women—in ASCOT and other statin
studies were tolerated by the FDA, thereby allowing marketing and approval
with insufficient information to detect statistically significant male-female
differences. This gender-related design failure is all the more troublesome
because of a history of having to withdraw from the market drugs that had
greater health risks for women and the FDA’s knowledge of that pattern.144
Second, postmarketing underreporting and failure of drug manufac-
turers to fulfill postmarketing safety commitments contribute to safety prob-
lems.145 Postmarketing behavior contributed to the possible mismarketing of
Lipitor. Specifically, assume that Lipitor’s approval for cardioprotection was
warranted for women despite the ASCOT study’s limitations. The increased
risk suggested by ASCOT’s results for women have nevertheless literally
screamed out for studies with enough women to establish Lipitor’s possible
cardioprotective, or increased risk, effects on CHD, MI, and NFMI for
women. Studies not done can signal a questionable regulatory system146 as
strongly as studies with flawed analysis. This problem is exacerbated by the
FDA allowing a single study to support drug approval,147 a practice fraught
with danger in any scientific endeavor.148 The Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAA)149 enhances FDA authority to require
143Furberg et al., supra note 133.
144U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Safety: Most Drugs Withdrawn in Recent Years Had
Greater Health Risks for Women (letter from Janet Heinrich to Senators Harkin, Snowe, and
Mikulski and Representative Waxman, Jan. 19, 2001).
145Furberg et al., supra note 133.
146A study funded by Merck & Co., Inc. assessed lovastatin’s performance in women in the
AFCAPS cohort. Clearfield et al., supra note 33. As Figure 1 shows, AFCAPS had the most
favorable efficacy results for women of the studies in this analysis. Pfizer’s Lipitor had the least
favorable efficacy results for women. Interestingly, to our knowledge, no article has been funded
by Pfizer assessing Lipitor’s cardioprotective performance in women not at high risk.
147Hutt et al., supra note 14, at 677.
148Richard Lempert, Empirical Research for Public Policy: Observations and Cautions, 5 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. (2008) (forthcoming).
149Pub. L. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
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postmarket clinical or other studies,150 but this process requires detailed FDA
findings, is limited to safety, does not include studies to assure efficacy,151 and
possibly will not be implemented for years to come.152
Third, the FDA’s limited expertise and resources in drug safety and
health are believed to contribute to undue adverse event risk.153 The Lipitor
experience suggests that the FDA’s monitoring of advertising also suffers
from expertise or resource limitations. Pfizer is reported to have spent more
than $258 million to advertise Lipitor from January 2006 to February 2008.154
That amount is roughly 50 percent of an entire year’s FDA budget for its
Human Drug Program.155 That budget is completely dwarfed by both the
drug industry’s consumer advertising, about $4 billion in 2005, and total
promotional spending, about $30 billion in 2005.156 However conscientious
the FDA is, it is unrealistic to expect it to keep up with an industry that can
afford such expenditures. As Robert Rabin has noted in the context of
discussing a strong regulatory FDA compliance-based defense, the case for
broad reliance on FDA action “is seriously compromised by real-world con-
siderations.”157 The FDAA will increase FDA funding158 but its resources will
continue to be dwarfed by those of drug companies.
Concrete contributions of tort law to knowledge of drug company
behavior suggest that the additional information developed by the tort
150FDAA § 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 922–26 (2007) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o),(p)).
151Id.
152Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Signals, and
the Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 347, 351 & n.11 (2008) (noting FDA official’s
statement that it may take years to implement some of the FDAA provisions).
153Furberg et al., supra note 133; Institute of Medicine, supra note 67, at 193 (FDA “lacks the
resources needed to accomplish its large and complex mission today”).
154Saul, supra note 6.
155See 〈http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2008/TOC.htm〉 (“Human Drugs” link),
accessed Mar. 8, 2008.
156Donohue et al., supra note 109, at 676 (tbl. 1).
157Robert Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 Geo. L.J. 2049, 2082 (2000).
158FDAA § 101 et seq., 121 Stat. at 825 (2007).
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system is useful and that strong preemption is therefore doubtful policy.159
When drug companies withhold or obscure material information about
adverse events from the FDA and scientific journals, a disturbingly common
practice,160 the additional resources provided by legal discovery and invest-
ments by plaintiffs’ lawyers can sometimes help remedy the nondisclosure.
For example, private legal actions uncovered the withholding or suppression
of critical safety data from the New England Journal of Medicine with respect to
Vioxx161 and possible senior executive unlawful encouragement of “off label”
use of Zyprexa.162 Other examples of drugs and devices that survived FDA
scrutiny but ultimately caused substantial harm abound.163 Drug company
misbehavior has become such a serious problem that the Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA ) requires independent statistical verifi-
cation of results in articles resulting from sponsored research. “[I]ndustry-
sponsored studies in which the data analysis has been conducted only by
159Cf. Rabin, supra note 157, at 2069 (“[I]f we are substantially dependent on the tort system to
provide the educational function of revealing massive cover-ups of health information by
industries like asbestos, or occasional efforts to conceal risk information from regulatory agen-
cies like the FDA, then it is undeniably the case that tort law is serving a positive function of some
consequence.”) (footnote omitted).
160Phil B. Fontanarosa & Catherine D. DeAngelis, JAMA’s Policy on Industry Sponsored Studies,
332 Brit. Med. J. 176–77 (2006) (numerous “serious scientific and ethical lapses involving
industry and industry sponsored studies, such as incomplete reporting of data on celecoxib,
suppression of studies of paroxetine, and delayed reporting of design defects in implantable
cardioverter defibrillators, have resulted in doctors and the public now having an unprec-
edented lack of trust and confidence in manufacturers of drugs and devices”).
161Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen Morrissey & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Expression of Concern:
Bombardier et al., “Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen
in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis,” N Engl J Med 2000;343:1520–8, 353 New Eng. J. Med.
2813 (2005); Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen Morrissey & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Expression of
Concern Reaffirmed, 354 New Eng. J. Med. 1193 (2006); Bruce M. Psaty & Richard A. Kronmal,
Reporting Mortality Findings in Trials of Rofecoxib for Alzheimer Disease or Cognitive Impair-
ment: A Case Study Based on Documents from Rofecoxib Litigation, 299 JAMA 1813 (2008).
Litigation also contributed to establishing the use of unacknowledged authors and later attri-
bution of “authorship to academically affiliated investigators who often did not disclose industry
financial support.” Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications
Related to Rofecoxib: A Case Study of Industry Documents from Rofecoxib Litigation, 299
JAMA 1800 (2008).
162Alex Berenson, Ely Lilly E-Mail Discussed Unapproved Use of Drug, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15,
2008.
163Schwartz, supra note 138, at 1348–52.
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statisticians employed by the company sponsoring the research will not be
accepted for publication in JAMA.”164
When studies consistently reveal uncertain efficacy for a group as large
as women, a system that imposes no duty to further test, but allows continued
marketing to millions of women, is insufficient. In the drug arena, as in other
areas of tort law, it is too hopeful to expect ready detection of efforts to
conceal or spin health information. Even an extremely well-functioning FDA
would likely miss concerted efforts to hide or shade results. The actual
functioning of the FDA may unintentionally promote concealment and spin.
JAMA’s editors have noted that “manipulation of studies and misrepresen-
tation of study results could not occur without the cooperation (active and
tacit) of . . . the FDA.”165 Tort litigation can play an important role for drugs,
as it has in uncovering questionable behavior in the tobacco and asbestos
industries.166
Beyond drug safety, state law causes of action also can contribute to
proper incentives with respect to studies of drug efficacy. With all of the
attention on drug safety, exemplified in the FDAA and most drug-related
lawsuits, the costs of questionable efficacy claims are less visible than they
should be. It is shameful that, while accumulating billions of dollars in profits
from statins, no drug company has yet published a study adequately powered
to test the efficacy of statins with respect to primary prevention of women’s
cardiovascular outcomes. That the FDA felt powerless to require such
studies, or felt that such studies were not needed, establishes that it should
not be the sole force shaping this aspect of health-care policy. The economic
costs of the questionable efficacy claims for statins may exceed the economic
cost of their adverse side effects. The flexibility of the common law and
consumer protection laws can contribute to creating appropriate incentives
for socially and economically beneficial behavior.
We do not suggest that the FDA should not have the dominant role in
regulating drugs. One can acknowledge generally greater agency ability to
164Phil B. Fontanarosa, Annette Flanagin & Catherine D. DeAngelis, Reporting Conflicts of
Interest, Financial Aspects of Research, and Role of Sponsors in Funded Studies, 294 JAMA 110,
111 (2005).
165Catherine D. DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Impugning the Integrity of Medical Science:
The Adverse Effects of Industry Influence, 299 JAMA 1833 (2008).
166See, e.g., Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial (1985); Peter
Pringle, Cornered: Big Tobacco at the Bar of Justice (1998).
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address matters without foreclosing other checks on drug company behav-
ior. However, a primary role need not be an exclusive role. Theoretical
structural arguments based on presumed agency expertise are not persuasive
against a history of specific agency failures. Arguments favoring exclusive
agency authority should be based on performance, not theoretical conjec-
ture. Given the resources and past behavior of the drug industry, it is likely
that more than one check on the industry is needed. Whether the additional
check best takes the form of tort actions is difficult to establish, but, for now,
the tort system is the leading existing additional regulatory check.
VII. Conclusion
Meta-analysis of leading RCT drug trials finds no evidence that statins protect
women against NFMI or fatal CHD in a primary prevention context. Unquali-
fied advertising claims of protection against heart attacks therefore may be
misleading. Existing legal doctrine supports the viability of state law claims
based on questionable advertising.
Our results also counsel against broad preemption of state law warning
claims, or broad application of regulatory compliance defenses, against the
background of drug company misbehavior, imperfect FDA performance,
and limited resources. The progression from the underlying scientific study
of Lipitor, ASCOT, expressly reporting no benefit for women, to Pfizer’s
advertising of the world’s best-selling drug while failing to disclose the
absence of benefit for women raises grave concern about the FDA’s regula-
tion of drugs and drug company candor.
This study also has implications for reining in health-care costs. The
growing167 multibillion dollar statins market significantly contributes to
increasing health-care expenses. Our findings indicate that each year rea-
sonably healthy women spend billions of dollars on drugs in the hope of
preventing heart attacks but that scientific evidence supporting their hope
does not exist.
167Raymond et al., supra note 2.
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